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GENDER EQUALITY: STATES AS LABORATORIESa
Dawn C. Nunziato
80 Virginia Law Review 945 (1994)

Introduction
Two decades ago, the calls of women’s groups for gender equality captured the attention of the legislatures, the courts, and the
academy. “Liberal” feminist theorists called for the passage of the federal Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”) and advocated
the Supreme Court’s application of heightened scrutiny to gender classifications. Meanwhile, “radical” feminist theorists
claimed that the liberal approach would achieve mere formal equality or equality of treatment between men and women but
would not establish women’s actual equality in society. These radical theorists called for more extensive, affirmative
government measures to achieve substantive equality for women.
The states’ failure to ratify the liberal-supported federal ERA and the Court’s failure to adopt a strict scrutiny standard for
gender-classificatory laws1 may appear to have rendered this liberal-radical debate academic. With the adoption of state equal
rights amendments by several states, however, this debate merely has shifted to different forums. Although state courts have
interpreted their state ERAs largely in accordance with the liberal analysis, the case law from these states provides material
from which to analyze the efficacy of both the liberal approach to gender equality and the radical theorists’ critique of that
approach. States with ERAs, therefore, serve as laboratories in which to consider the larger issue concerning which approach
is more promising for achieving women’s equality.
Part I of this Note briefly surveys different theoretical approaches to equality in general, exploring the contours of symmetrical
and asymmetrical theories of equality. Part II focuses on gender equality theory in particular and considers liberal feminists’
call for equality of treatment as well as radical feminists’ demand for equality of results. Part III examines state courts’
interpretations of their state ERAs -- in particular, in areas where the applications of radical and liberal feminism support
different results -- in order to assess the efficacy of these theories in practice. Part IV draws some lessons from states’
experiments with equality and concludes that while the liberals’ call for gender-neutral legislation should be heeded in general,
the radical approach offers important insights into how legislation and doctrine can be crafted to achieve formal and substantive
equality for women.
I. Defining “Equality”
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “equal protection of the laws,” 2 but courts and
commentators disagree on how to interpret and apply this mandate of equality. Broadly speaking, two competing mediating
principles for interpreting the Equal Protection Clause have been advanced: the symmetrical antidiscrimination principle and
the asymmetrical disadvantaged-group principle.
The antidiscrimination mediating principle is one of negative restraint that forbids the government from arbitrarily
discriminating against classes of individuals. This principle prohibits legislative classifications based on illegitimate criteria,
such as gender or race. The antidiscrimination principle is derived from the premise that equal protection requires equal
treatment, which in turn requires that similarly situated parties are treated similarly. This mediating principle for interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause theoretically does not provide for affirmative government action to achieve equality, but merely
serves as a negative restraint on illegitimate government classifications.
Equality theorists have criticized the antidiscrimination principle for its failure to recognize that the core problems of inequality
are faced by distinct disadvantaged groups, such as women and blacks, and for its inability to remedy or improve the status of
these subordinated groups in society.3 Professor Owen Fiss, an early critic of the antidiscrimination principle, offers in its place
an asymmetrical mediating principle, the disadvantaged-group principle, for interpreting the Equal Protection Clause.4
Professor Fiss argues that the proper concern of equal protection is with laws and practices that hurt disadvantaged groups in
particular and that aggravate and perpetuate the subordinated position of such groups.5 His disadvantaged-group principle

identifies social groups requiring special protection (including women and blacks), and calls for deferential judicial scrutiny
(in practice, allowance) of policies benefiting disadvantaged groups and heightened scrutiny (disallowance) of policies
impairing the status of such groups.6 Thus, the disadvantaged-group principle provides for an asymmetrical standard of scrutiny
of legislation, with the level of scrutiny dependent upon whether disadvantaged groups are harmed or benefited by the
legislation at issue, whereas the antidiscrimination principle provides for a symmetrical standard of scrutiny regardless of
whether the legislative classification harms or benefits a disadvantaged group.
For the past century, the Supreme Court has struggled with the issue of how to interpret the Equal Protection Clause. In his oftquoted dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,7 Justice John Marshall Harlan ostensibly adopted a symmetrical antidiscrimination
principle, stating that “our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” 8 On the other
hand, the famous language of Carolene Products9 footnote four arguably endorsed an asymmetrical disadvantaged-group
principle, suggesting that heightened scrutiny should be applied in cases of prejudice against “discrete and insular minorities,”10
rather than in all cases involving suspect classifications. The Court, however, rejected such an asymmetrical interpretation in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 11 stating that “the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color.” 12
The Court also appears to have rejected an asymmetrical disadvantaged-group principle with respect to gender discrimination.
In Craig v. Boren,13 for example, the Court applied heightened scrutiny to a gender-based statute that facially disadvantaged
men.14 Similarly, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 15 the Court noted, “That this statutory policy discriminates
against males rather than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the standard of review.”16 In accordance
with the antidiscrimination principle, the Court appears formally to apply the same level of scrutiny for “benign” gender
classifications as for patently invidious ones.17
Tensions still exist among the Justices, however, regarding the proper principle for interpreting equal protection in the area of
gender. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, for example, has argued repeatedly that heightened judicial scrutiny should apply
only to laws which discriminate against members of the disadvantaged group (i.e., against women) rather than to all laws that
classify by gender.18 The proper selection of an interpretive principle, therefore, is an important and unsettled issue in equal
protection theory, especially in the area of gender equality.
II. Theories of Gender Equality
In recent years, the issue surrounding the proper interpretation of the equal protection mandate has been joined by theorists of
gender equality. In general, liberal feminist theorists have adopted a symmetrical antidiscrimination theory of gender equality
and have emphasized equality of treatment; radical feminists have advocated an asymmetrical approach and focused on equality
of results for women.
Much has been written about liberal feminist theory, radical feminist theory, and the general differences between the two. 19
Essentially, liberal feminism calls for equal treatment of men and women, or formal equality, and focuses on the fairness of the
means of legislation; radical feminism focuses on equality of results, or substantive equality, which demands special treatment
of women where necessary to attain this goal. Liberal feminists, in accord with the antidiscrimination principle, call for gender
neutrality in legislation; radical feminists claim that in order to rectify the inferior position in which former discrimination has
placed women, lawmakers and judges must take gender into account. Radical feminists believe that their liberal counterparts’
call for equal treatment of the sexes would be efficacious only in an ideal world, and that their own approach attempts to bring
about justice for women given a less than ideal world by addressing the fact that women are in an inferior starting position to
men.20
In theory, liberal feminists oppose forward-looking (nonremedial) special treatment for women. Radical feminists, on the other
hand, consider special treatment acceptable and necessary in some instances. Whereas liberal feminism calls for a symmetrical
principle of equal protection, radical feminists sanction an asymmetrical principle to apply deferential scrutiny to genderclassificatory legislation that benefits women and stricter scrutiny to legislation that facially and concretely discriminates
against women.
A. Liberal Feminism’s Interpretation of the ERA: The Call for Equal Treatment

In line with their basic position on equality theory, liberal feminists interpret the federal ERA 21 as a broad prohibition on
legislative gender classifications. Barbara Brown, Thomas Emerson, Gail Falk, and Ann Freedman (“the Yale ERA
commentators”), who most notably present the liberal feminist interpretation of the federal ERA, argue that in order to eliminate
women’s historically inferior social position, courts should go beyond strict scrutiny and construe the ERA to prohibit gender
classifications in the law.22
Although they conclude that gender-based classifications generally should be barred, the Yale ERA commentators assert that
the ERA would permit classifications based on a physical characteristic unique to one sex, such as pregnancy. 23 The authors
emphasize, however, that this exception would not extend to purported psychological, social, or other such asserted differences
between the sexes.24 The authors argue that because this exception is susceptible of being used as a subterfuge for
discrimination,25 classifications based on unique physical characteristics must bear a “close, direct and narrow relationship” to
the asserted state purpose.26
The liberal approach to gender discrimination, in particular as applied to the interpretation of the federal Equal Rights
Amendment, has influenced state courts in their interpretation of state ERAs. 27 But this approach is not without its critics.
Radical theorists have argued that the liberal approach will not effectively bring about women’s substantive equality. The next
Section considers the relevant aspects of the radical feminists’ critique.
B. The Radical Feminists’ Challenge: Demanding Equality of Results
In challenging the liberal feminist approach, Catharine MacKinnon, a leading radical feminist, extends Professor Fiss’ analysis
of equal protection doctrine28 to the area of gender equality. Building upon Professor Fiss’ disadvantaged-group analysis,
Professor MacKinnon develops an asymmetrical model of “substantive” gender equality, 29 which emphasizes equality of results
rather than equality or similarity of treatment. 30
MacKinnon condemns the uncritical acceptance by the courts and by liberal feminists of a “masculine” notion of equality
embodied in the antidiscrimination principle’s “similarly situated” requirement. 31 MacKinnon contends that the similarly
situated requirement limits gender equality to “those issues men recognize as equality issues because they arise in contexts in
which men now know they sometimes treat other men arbitrarily and irrationally.”32 MacKinnon claims that by reducing the
real problem faced by women -- their subordination to men in all elements of society -- to the tidy issue of classification by
gender in legislation, the liberal antidiscrimination approach “leaves out the social institutionalization of practices through
which women are violated, abused, exploited, and patronized by men socially . . . .” 33 According to MacKinnon, while the
problems of women in society include their subordination and exploitation economically, socially, and sexually, liberal
feminism’s response to these problems -- calling for scrutiny of legislative gender classifications -- merely addresses future
legislatively imposed harms and thus falls woefully short of achieving substantive equality. 34
MacKinnon proposes an alternative model for securing gender equality whereby courts would strike down policies or practices
that contribute to the maintenance of women’s subordinated position, regardless of whether such laws classify on the basis of
gender.35 This “subordination model”36 would explicitly acknowledge the subjugated position of women in society and would
work to abolish subordinating social practices that may not be readily cognizable under the liberal feminist analysis. 37
In sum, MacKinnon argues that the real barriers to women’s substantive equality will not be remedied adequately by the liberal
feminists’ call for prohibiting legislative classifications by gender; rather, the symmetrical antidiscrimination principle
advocated by liberal feminists may result in perpetuating women’s subordinated position in society. In lieu of the liberal
approach, MacKinnon offers her subordination model for assessing the legality of laws and practices that implicate gender
equality.
While the radical-liberal debate is interesting on an academic level, it is not limited to the realm of theory. In evaluating liberal
and radical theories of gender equality, feminist theorists may find it useful to observe such theories in action. As discussed in
the next Section, state courts’ interpretations of their state ERAs provide such an opportunity to apply and evaluate the different
theories of gender equality.
III. States’ Experiments with Gender Discrimination

In the 1970s, several states began experimenting with different models for protecting their citizens against gender
discrimination. Between 1971 and 1974, fourteen states adopted equal rights amendments in some form. 38 In interpreting their
ERAs, these states have served as laboratories for testing and evaluating theories of gender equality. 39
The interpretation of ERAs in these states has brought about changes in gender-based statutes in many areas of the law. In order
to evaluate the relative merits of competing feminist theories, it is useful to focus on those areas in which liberal and radical
theories compel different results. Such controversial subject areas of application include domestic relations, criminal law,
insurance, and school athletics.
A. Domestic Relations
In the domestic relations arena, state courts have utilized state ERAs to strike down many types of gender classifications, with
some of the major developments occurring in child custody matters. States have rejected statutory presumptions that mothers
are the more fit custodians40 and that fathers have the primary child support obligation,41 and have required gender-neutral duties
of child support for children born out of wedlock. 42 Additionally, fathers of children born outside of marriage have gained the
right, previously held only by mothers, to withhold consent from their child’s adoption. 43
State courts also have invalidated many gender-based classifications in the areas of marriage and divorce. For example, the
Illinois Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, invalidated a statutory scheme that required men to be twenty-one to marry
without parental consent while allowing women to marry at eighteen without consent, finding no compelling purpose to justify
this difference in treatment.44 Years before the United States Supreme Court struck down laws restricting alimony obligations
to husbands,45 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated separation and divorce remedies provided only to wives. 46 This
court also held that the Pennsylvania ERA prohibits statutes that presume either the husband’s ownership of household
property47 or his dominance in the marriage with respect to the negotiation of prenuptial and separation agreements. 48 Likewise,
this court invalidated a statute that failed to recognize the nonmonetary contribution of homemakers to marital property. 49
Courts in ERA states also have abolished or gender-neutralized several traditionally gender-specific common-law actions in
the domestic relations field. These courts have invalidated common-law criminal conversation actions that allowed only
husbands to sue their spouse’s sexual partner for damages, 50 extended to wives the right to recover damages for loss of their
husbands’ consortium,51 and mandated gender-neutral duties of spousal support during marriage. 52
Despite the fears of ERA opponents,53 two areas that have remained relatively unaffected by state ERAs are restrictions on
same-sex marriages and abortion. States ostensibly applying absolute bars to gender classifications have refused to grant
homosexual couples the right to marry, relying upon the commonplace definition of marriage 54 and claiming that their decisions
entail a classification by sexual preference rather than by gender.55 States also have refused to recognize abortion rights under
their ERAs, claiming that providing state funding for childbirth and not for abortion turns on a woman’s decision to abort and
therefore does not involve an impermissible gender classification. 56
The liberal feminist interpretation offered by the Yale ERA commentators largely has guided courts in interpreting their ERAs
in the domestic relations arena.57 This body of case law thus offers an opportunity to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of
the liberal analysis. On the one hand, states have abolished many gender classifications that, under the guise of “protecting”
women, actually served to discriminate invidiously against and to stereotype women. 58 On the other hand, by requiring equal
treatment of men and women in a world in which women are socially and financially subordinate to men, such state ERA cases
may have served to perpetuate or worsen women’s subordinated position. 59 In the past two decades, for example, male plaintiffs
have utilized state ERAs to require women to pay more money in child support, 60 to compel women to contribute more money
to their husbands’ expenses,61 and to prevent women from rescinding prenuptial or separation agreements that arguably were
agreed to under duress.62
The prevalence of successful male plaintiffs in state domestic relations ERA actions may support radical feminists’ criticism
of the inefficacy of the antidiscrimination principle for achieving substantive equality for women. 63 By striving to achieve
women’s formal equality rather than to remedy women’s subordinated status, interpretations in such cases may have worsened
women’s position in society.64 For example, regarding the imposition of gender neutrality in custody preferences, one
commentator writes,
The removal of presumptions favoring maternal custody of young children, although an important symbolic affirmation of

gender equality, carried a substantial price. In order to avoid expensive, traumatic, and perhaps unsuccessful custody fights,
many mothers traded away property and support claims. . . .
....
. . . What apparently escaped notice of courts imposing gender neutrality in this area were the inequalities in men’s and women’s
status following divorce.65 Furthermore, the trend toward equalization of child support payments from mothers and fathers 66
may have harmful and disparate effects on women, who on average make 70 cents to every dollar a man makes. 67 As one
commentator notes regarding mandated equality in the domestic relations arena,
Women’s . . . needs in this society may continue to be undervalued and ignored unless the equality rhetoric now associated
with the relationship between the sexes is challenged as inappropriate for resolving situations where they stand in inherently
unequal positions. . . . The metaphor has symbolic content that is preserved only at significant cost to many women who must
suffer equality in this one area while the rest of the society and culture continues to treat them unequally. 68
The disagreement between the majority and the concurrence in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Simeone v.
Simeone69 further highlights some of the tensions between liberal and radical theory as applied in the domestic relations arena.
Declaring the presumption of male dominance in the negotiation of prenuptial agreements unconstitutional, the majority
rejected the validity of the implied presumption that women are “uninformed, uneducated, and readily subjected to unfair
advantage in marital agreements.”70 The court stated that “paternalistic presumptions and protections that arose to shelter
women from the inferiorities and incapacities which they were perceived as having in earlier times have, appropriately, been
discarded.”71
The concurrence, however, criticized the majority’s opinion for its erroneous assumption that, upon the passage of the state
ERA, “all vestiges of inequality between the sexes have been erased,”72 and claimed that the author of the majority opinion
“does not live in the real world.”73 The concurrence asserted that the majority opinion makes “unnecessary and unwarranted
declarations regarding the ‘equality’ of women” after the passage of the ERA, declarations which, on their face, “smack of
male chauvinism, an attitude that ‘you women asked for it, now live with it.’ ” 74
The majority and concurring opinions in this case reflect the tensions between the liberal and radical feminist positions. While
the majority focuses on eradicating gender classifications embodied in laws, the concurrence emphasizes the fact that women
in general and the plaintiff in particular are not in a substantially equal position to men with respect to prenuptial agreement
negotiations. The concurrence joins radical feminists in asserting that treating women equally before the law -- and thus
ignoring their subordinated position -- may be insufficient to secure women’s actual equality in society. The majority aims for
“justice in an ideal world”75 in which women are equal in bargaining power to men, and consequently mandates the equal
treatment of male and female participants to the contract negotiation. The concurrence, however, argues for the recognition of
the relevant features of our less than ideal world and emphasizes that the law should intervene to “protect the subservient party”
in order to secure substantive equality, and not just equality of treatment, for the female litigant. 76
Thus, although ERA-mandated gender neutrality in the domestic relations arena successfully has eradicated legal countenance
of sex-based stereotyping, it may have failed to address or remedy the reality of deeper sex-based disadvantages. The trend
toward formally abolishing gender classifications in state domestic relations cases has not had a unilaterally positive effect
toward achieving substantive equality for women. Perhaps by striving for equality in an ideal world, judges applying liberal
feminist conceptions in interpreting ERAs in this area have ignored those relevant features of our imperfect world that stand in
the way of women’s substantive equality.
B. Criminal Law
State plaintiffs have successfully invoked state ERAs to strike down certain types of gender-specific criminal laws, whereas
other types have withstood constitutional attack. For example, courts have consistently invalidated gender distinctions in the
area of criminal procedure. Applying their state ERAs, courts have prohibited the use of gender-based peremptory challenges,
which deny the equal rights of female venirepersons.77 The Illinois Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, invalidated a
gender-discriminatory statute that treated seventeen-year-old male criminal defendants as adults while treating females of the
same age as juveniles, finding no compelling state interest for the distinction. 78

Gender-based criminal statutes involving sexual crimes, however, have been more resistant to state constitutional challenge.
States have upheld incest statutes79 and sexual imposition statutes80 providing greater penalties for male than female offenders.
State courts applying strict scrutiny,81 as well as those ostensibly imposing absolute bars to gender classifications,82 have upheld
gender-based rape statutes by applying exceedingly deferential scrutiny to the legislation at issue. In ERA-based challenges to
gender-specific statutory rape provisions, one state court has upheld differential treatment of male and female participants by
referencing the unique physical characteristics exception to the mandate of gender neutrality articulated by the Yale ERA
commentators.83 Several states, however, have read gender-neutral language into their gender-specific statutes governing sex
crimes in order to insulate the statutes from ERA-based attack.84
Courts’ divergent treatment of legislative gender classifications in cases involving sexual crimes reflects the disparate views of
liberal and radical gender theorists on this issue. While liberal feminists85 (and Supreme Court Justices supportive of liberal
feminism)86 would abolish gender classifications in this area, radical theorists like MacKinnon condemn such action. Facial
gender neutralization in this area, according to MacKinnon, forestalls the requisite legal recognition of such “distinctive abuses
of women as a gender.”87 For example, MacKinnon criticizes the dissenting opinion in Michael M. for advocating gender
neutralization of the statutory rape law at issue:
The dissent revealed more concern with avoiding the stereotyping attendant to the ideological message the law communicated
than with changing the facts that make the stereotype largely true. In the interest of opposing facial distinctions and debunking
the supposed myth of male sexual aggression, the fact that it is overwhelmingly girls who are sexually victimized by older
males . . . was completely obscured. The facts of social inequality . . . that could have supported particular legislative attention
to the sexual assault of girls were not even considered. 88
Judges in several strict scrutiny states appear to be consistent with MacKinnon’s asymmetrical approach in applying a more
deferential standard of review to uphold gender-classificatory laws that disadvantage only male offenders in sexual crimes. 89
Because the definition of sexual crimes is often closely related to unique physical differences between males and females, state
courts have relied upon this exception to uphold gender classifications in such statutes. 90 In sum, the treatment of cases involving
sexual crimes largely suggests a rejection in practice of the liberal feminists’ call for gender-neutral legislation and an adoption
of an approach closer to the radical feminists’, which recognizes the reality in our imperfect world of females’ sexual
victimization by males.
C. Insurance
State ERA litigation has also challenged the permissibility of gender-based insurance rates and insurance coverage. Applying
the state ERA, a Pennsylvania court struck down an insurance statute authorizing differential automobile insurance rates based
on gender (while prohibiting differential rates based on race, religion, or national origin). 91 The court found that even though
gender-differentiated rates were based on sound actuarial principles, the rates were impermissible because they relied on and
perpetuated invidious stereotypes.92 To allow such rates, the court concluded, would be contrary to the state ERA’s goal of
“eliminating sex as a basis for distinction.”93 In subsequent litigation, the Pennsylvania National Organization for Women
claimed that newly established unisex rates were unfair to women because the rates required female drivers in effect to
“subsidize” male drivers. The court, however, rejected this challenge and held that these unisex rates did not violate the state
ERA.94
Because liberal feminists generally advocate gender neutrality in legislation, one could reasonably assume that they would
support the abolition of gender classifications in insurance rates and regulations -- even if this abolition would entail higher
rates for women.95 However, the National Organization for Women (“NOW”), typically considered a liberal feminist
organization,96 has opposed unisex rates because of their directly detrimental effect on women. 97 MacKinnon, representing the
radical feminist position, favors the stance of the Pennsylvania NOW on this issue, claiming that gender-neutral rates are less
desirable than gender-specific rates because the former require women to pay for auto insurance “at the rate at which men need
it.”98
Liberal and radical feminist theorists, therefore, appear to agree that the unisex insurance rates mandated by state ERAs,
although gender neutral, are undesirable because they are disadvantageous to women. This position for the liberal feminists,
however, seems to be inconsistent. It could be argued that the liberal feminists, in advocating gender neutrality in legislation,
must take the bitter with the sweet. Liberal feminists generally contend that empirical generalizations, even if accurate, cannot
be utilized to support gender classifications in legislation. For example, the Yale ERA commentators argue that average

differences between men and women -- statistically measurable differences between the sexes considered as groups, such as
the fact that men are generally stronger, more athletic, or better educated -- must not be allowed to justify gender-based
classifications.99 Similarly, Justice Brennan, who adopted the liberal feminist approach in Craig v. Boren, 100 rejected statistically
measured generalities about the sexes as a justification for the gender-differentiated alcohol consumption law at issue in the
case.101 Thus, while MacKinnon’s subordination test for gender-classificatory legislation is consistent in its support of genderdifferentiated insurance rates -- which do not contribute to the maintenance of women’s subordinated position -- it is difficult
for the liberal feminist to defend such a result. If liberal feminists feel strongly about the desirability of gender-differentiated
insurance rates, this contention would militate against their position of strict legislative gender neutrality.
Another important area involving gender classifications in insurance law is health insurance coverage of pregnancy. The
passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,102 which defined pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination actionable under
Title VII, rendered moot state efforts to make this same move under state ERAs. It is sufficient to note briefly that state plaintiffs
have utilized ERAs to buttress their challenge to health insurance policies that exclude coverage of pregnancy-related costs. In
Colorado, for example, a female litigant challenged her employer’s group health insurance policy, which excluded normal
pregnancy expenses, by relying in part on the state ERA.103 The court in that case held that the employer had violated the state
ERA by providing insurance that excluded from coverage medical expenses associated with normal pregnancy,104 noting that
an employer offers fewer benefits to female employees on the basis of sex when it fails to provide them insurance coverage for
pregnancy while providing male employees comprehensive coverage for all conditions, including those conditions unique to
men. This disparity in the provision of comprehensive insurance benefits as a part of employment compensation constitutes
discriminatory conduct on the basis of sex.105
The debate among feminists on the issue of pregnancy discrimination is too wide-ranging and complex to be addressed
adequately herein. It will suffice to observe briefly that liberal feminists in general (and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act)
assimilate pregnancy-related disabilities with other types of disabilities.106 Radical feminists, however, criticize this move and
argue that the liberal antidiscrimination principle is least well-suited to achieve equality for women in the area of pregnancy
discrimination, and that special treatment of pregnancy is necessary. 107
In sum, state ERAs have been utilized to strike down gender-based insurance rates even though such rates rested on statistically
accurate generalizations and were financially favorable to women. State ERAs also have been used to buttress challenges to
insurance policies that excluded coverage of pregnancy expenses.
D. School Athletics
In the arena of school athletics, the interpretation of state ERAs has served both to insulate female teams from participation by
males and to open up all-male teams to female membership.108 For example, in Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass’n, 109 a high
school denied a male student’s attempt to join the school’s all-female volleyball team where the school offered no opportunities
for males to play volleyball. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the gender-segregated team by focusing explicitly on equality
of results -- competitive athletic opportunities for both sexes -- instead of equality of treatment.110 Because it accepted the
presumption that boys generally were better athletes than girls and thus likely would take over girls’ positions on the team, the
majority argued that explicitly granting boys equal treatment and allowing them to join the volleyball team would diminish
girls’ athletic opportunities.111 According to the court, by maintaining volleyball as the all-female fall sport and football as the
all-male fall sport, the school provided comparable athletic opportunities -- equality of results -- for both boys and girls.112
The Petrie dissent, however, criticized the majority’s adoption of an asymmetrical disadvantaged-group principle for the
purpose of protecting female athletic opportunities. The dissent stated that it could not accept the majority’s application of a
different standard of scrutiny for interpreting the ERA when males instead of females were facially disadvantaged by the law
at issue, noting that “there can no longer be any question but that freedom from discrimination is a two-way door.”113 Referring
to the explicitly symmetrical principle of equal protection adopted by the Supreme Court in Bakke, the dissent quoted from
Justice Lewis Powell’s judgment of the Court: “ ‘It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons
permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others.’ ” 114
While applauding the result the majority strove to reach, the dissent adhered to liberal feminist theory by emphasizing equality
of treatment over equality of results. The dissent argued that the means by which the majority reached its result -- the
countenance of broad presumptions about the average differences in athletic skill possessed by members of the class of each

gender -- was impermissible.115 The dissent noted that “sex-based generalizations have been discarded in many cases where
there was statistical support for the presumption upon which the classifications were based,” 116 and argued, quoting Craig, that
“the weakness of such statistics as predictors of any one individual’s behavior ‘merely illustrates that proving broad sociological
propositions by statistics . . . inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause.’
”117 In an effort to illustrate the tension with the normative philosophy of equality inherent in the majority’s approach of
“protecting weaker from stronger athletes,”118 the dissent noted,
Surely, not even the majority here, nor society generally, would condone the exclusion of blacks from an all-white basketball
team on the grounds that blacks generally are more skilled at the game than whites and might tend to dominate it. . . . There are
legally tolerable means of categorizing athletes by size, strength, and ability. To adopt sex as a proxy for more precisely defined
means of leveling off competition is both illegal and irrational. 119
Quoting Justice John Paul Stevens, the dissent concluded that gender equality must mean fairness to individuals, not fairness
to groups in general, and therefore that the state ERA must be interpreted to preclude treatment of individuals simply as
components of a gender class.120 It should be noted, however, that the dissent’s rejection of an asymmetrical disadvantagedgroup principle in favor of an antidiscrimination principle compels a result that may be directly harmful to the class of females
in the short term by allowing males to displace females on the school volleyball team.
In Darrin v. Gould,121 the Washington Supreme Court heard the ERA challenge of two fully qualified high school girls who
were denied permission to play on the all-male high school football team because of their gender. The court recognized that
the sort of disadvantaged-group rationale advanced by the Petrie majority -- the protection and fostering of girls’ athletic
opportunities -- “ ‘can obviously have no validity with respect to those sports for which only one team exists in a school and
that team’s membership is limited exclusively to boys.’ ”122 The court rejected the use of statistically based generalities to justify
the assumption that girls as a group are weaker or more injury prone than boys and thus could be excluded on the basis of those
average differences.123 The court focused instead on equality of treatment for the individual girls in question, noting that “ ‘if
any individual girl is too weak, injury-prone, or unskilled, she may, of course, be excluded from competition on that basis but
she cannot be excluded solely because of her sex without regard to her relevant qualifications.’ ” 124
As Petrie and Darrin illustrate, the treatment in the ERA states of gender segregation in athletics reflects the divergent analyses
of feminist theorists of this issue. Focusing on equality of results instead of equality of treatment, radical feminists claim that
mandating gender neutrality in athletic regulations may diminish overall women’s equality in athletics. 125 Liberal feminists,
however, generally reject the special treatment doctrine justifying gender segregation in athletics. 126 While supportive of the
goal of promoting females’ athletic opportunities, liberal feminists claim that this end must be achieved without the use of
presumptions or classifications based on gender. Instead, gender-neutral classifications such as height, weight, or skill must be
relied upon in the effort to promote meaningful athletic competition for members of both sexes. According to liberal feminists,
because the use of statistically based generalizations regarding the average differences between the sexes is capable of such
serious misuse, such generalizations must be barred in all instances and cannot be paraded out when convenient for women. 127
In sum, ERAs have had a pronounced effect on many areas of state law. Considering courts’ interpretations of their ERAs in
controversial areas provides insights into the relative merits of liberal feminist and radical feminist theory, as applied. The
lessons that can be drawn from state courts’ experiences in applying these theories will be considered further in the next Part.
IV. Lessons from States’ Experiments
In interpreting their ERAs, state courts generally have comported with the liberal feminist approach to gender equality by
abolishing or strictly scrutinizing gender classifications embodied in legislation and common-law doctrines. Radical feminists
such as MacKinnon have been critical of the liberal feminists’ goal of formal equality and have offered instead an explicitly
substantive analysis that would directly address women’s subordinated position in society. State courts’ experimentation with
implementing feminist theory indicates the shortcomings of both liberal and radical theory and provides insights towards
synthesizing the two.
A consideration of state ERA litigation illustrates some inadequacies in the liberal feminists’ call to abolish essentially all
gender classifications in legislation. In the domestic relations area, liberal feminism arguably has been applied to compel
women to “suffer equality” to their detriment. 128 Abolishing legislative gender classifications in this area, for example, has
worked to restrict women whose spouses psychologically dominated them in contract negotiation from rescinding such

contracts,129 to mandate equalization of alimony obligations and child support,130 and to deprive women more readily of custody
of their children,131 thereby worsening women’s status relative to the analogous gender-specific laws. The gender neutralization
of statutes involving sexual crimes132 arguably serves to mask males’ sexual dominance and coercive behavior and to forestall
legal attention to this abuse of women “as a gender.”133 In insurance regulation, gender neutralization has required women to
pay higher auto insurance premiums,134 in effect, to subsidize the inferior driving habits of their male counterparts. In the arena
of school athletics, males have invoked liberal feminism’s call for gender neutralization to claim the right to participate on allfemale sports teams,135 a result which arguably would worsen women’s athletic opportunities. A survey of state ERA litigation,
therefore, lends credence to the radical feminists’ charge that liberal feminism serves to bring about women’s formal equality
but is deficient in securing their substantive equality.
Considering the problems inherent in the liberal approach, it may be argued that the radical program for women’s substantive
equality should be pursued instead. If, as MacKinnon contends, liberal feminism’s call for abolishment of gender classifications
in our imperfect world tends to freeze women in their subordinated status, an approach that explicitly recognizes and addresses
women’s unequal starting position would seem to be more advantageous.
MacKinnon claims that the path to women’s substantive equality begins with the judicial adoption of her proposed
subordination model, which requires judges to invalidate those practices and policies that contribute to the subordination of
women.136 This asymmetrical approach would leave intact legislation classifying on the basis of gender as long as such
legislation does not contribute to the maintenance of women’s subordinated position. MacKinnon’s subordination model
arguably would serve to uphold much of the legislation that liberal feminism would strike down. For example, in the domestic
relations arena, the subordination principle would uphold gender-specific laws requiring males to pay more in child support or
alimony than females as well as laws embodying the presumption of a husband’s psychological dominance in contracting with
his wife. Because such laws cause concrete harms to men and are challenged by male plaintiffs, MacKinnon’s asymmetrical
approach calling for deferential judicial scrutiny of gender-classificatory laws harming males arguably would uphold such
laws.137 Similarly, the subordination approach would validate laws punishing only males in sex crimes, including statutory
rape.138 In the arena of school athletics, MacKinnon’s approach arguably would preserve gender-segregated teams, or at least
insulate all-female teams from challenge by male litigants.
Despite its utility in addressing laws that cause concrete harms to women, MacKinnon’s subordination principle may be
ineffectual in its failure to abolish laws that cause stigmatic harms to women as well as concrete harms to men. 139 For example,
a child custody law which embodies the presumption that the mother is the more fit custodian may cause concrete harms to
men by working to deny them custody of their children, but also causes stigmatic harm to women by embodying an invidious
“separate spheres” ideology, in which the childrearing function “naturally” belongs in the women’s sphere. Similarly, a
domestic relations law that embodies a presumption of male psychological dominance in intraspousal contracts may cause
concrete harms to men -- thus provoking them to challenge its constitutionality -- but also causes stigmatic harms to women by
embodying the invidious stereotype that women as a class are psychologically subordinate or inferior to men. Because
MacKinnon’s subordination approach arguably would apply to uphold such laws -- in contradistinction to the liberal genderneutralization approach140 -- it would leave intact such embodiments of harmful gender stereotypes. Thus, MacKinnon’s
subordination approach would not eradicate legal recognition of stigmatic harms to women that the majority of recent genderclassificatory laws embody.
Furthermore, an asymmetrical approach, exemplified by MacKinnon’s subordination principle, calls for the establishment of
different standards of scrutiny for laws discriminating against men and for those discriminating against women. As a practical
matter, this approach lends itself to misapplication and misuse. A court may have difficulty determining whether a genderclassificatory law harms men or women, as the Supreme Court’s difficulties in this area have demonstrated. 141 Worse yet, a
court may use this asymmetrical standard to uphold invidious protectionist discrimination against women “which, in practical
effect, puts women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.” 142 A critic of MacKinnon has argued that the subordination approach
makes a return to such an era of invidious protectionist discrimination “all too likely,” 143 noting that Muller v. Oregon,144 a
protectionist Lochner145 era case restricting women’s working hours on the rationale that women’s primary function was to bear
children, was cited approvingly by a 1974 Supreme Court case upholding remedial legislation on behalf of women. 146 Thus, the
dangers inherent in applying a double standard to gender-discriminatory laws militate against MacKinnon’s subordination
approach to gender equality.147 Furthermore, MacKinnon’s subordination model is problematic in that it relies on the courts to
make subjective and complex judgments as to whether laws contribute to the subordination of women. It is far easier for a
judge effectively to apply the liberal analysis’ virtually absolute bar to gender-classificatory laws than it is effectively to apply
the MacKinnon subordination test. If judges interpreting state ERAs were required to undertake the complex subordination
inquiry before striking down gender-classificatory laws, it is doubtful that many such laws would fall.

Consideration of state ERA litigation has illustrated advantages and disadvantages of the liberal and radical feminist
approaches, as presently constituted. States’ experiments with gender equality also suggest a direction for synthesis of these
two theoretical approaches, in what will be referred to as the “informed gender-neutral” approach.
The informed gender-neutral approach recognizes that eradication of legislative gender classifications as required by the liberal
approach benefits women by abolishing the embodiments of stigmatic harms, but also harms women by its failure to take
cognizance of women’s unequal starting position and its lack of sensitivity to the types of disadvantages confronted by many
women in our imperfect world. The informed gender-neutral approach acknowledges and incorporates the critiques offered by
radical feminism, which have served to isolate those aspects of our imperfect world that bring the most harm to women. This
approach utilizes radical feminist theory to help identify areas of women’s subordination which serve “as a clue, as a ‘logic of
identification’ to the location of subordinated . . . groups for whom legal assistance may be helpful.” 148 This approach recognizes
opportunities for using gender-neutral legislation truly to remedy individual women’s subordinate position, to ameliorate
concrete harms as well as the stigmatic harms that accompany gender-specific classifications. Given the radical feminist
critique, which identifies areas in our less than ideal world in which men tend to be psychologically, financially, sexually, and
athletically dominant, the informed gender-neutral approach calls for the crafting of gender-neutral legislation and doctrines to
remedy these types of subordination -- regardless of the gender of the subordinated party.
Under an informed gender-neutral approach, for example, courts would consider whether either party to a prenuptial or
separation agreement exercised impermissibly coercive behavior. Thus, while the gender-based presumption of a husband’s
psychological dominance in spousal contract negotiations would be abolished, the court would not turn a blind eye to the
existence of any overreaching which may have occurred and would not force women to “suffer equality.” Instead, judges would
consider whether, given the particular circumstances of the case, impermissible spousal coercion occurred during contract
negotiations and would grant appropriate relief to the coerced party, whether husband or wife. Similarly, under the informed
gender-neutral approach, statutory rape and sexual imposition statutes would be drafted in gender-neutral language but tailored
to identify the party exercising impermissibly coercive sexual behavior. Under this approach, athletic regulations would be
drafted in terms of finely tuned gender-neutral classifications that foster meaningful athletic opportunities between persons of
equal skill and ability regardless of their gender. By refusing to use “female” as a placeholder for “the psychologically or
financially or sexually or athletically subordinate party,” such informed gender-neutral legislation and judicial doctrines would
serve to remedy actual problems faced by women, while not crystallizing harmful gender stereotypes nor embodying stigmatic
harms to women. By addressing disparities in starting positions without making classification turn on gender, informed gender
neutrality serves the goals of both formal and substantive equality.
In sum, radical feminist analysis is helpful in identifying the types of disadvantages -- sexual, psychological, economic, or
physical subordination -- that historically have confronted women as a class. The critiques offered by theorists such as
MacKinnon have served to identify those aspects of our imperfect world that bring the most harm to women. Feminists in state
legislatures and courthouses should adopt an informed gender-neutral approach to remedy women’s subordinate position in
society by attending carefully to such factors and by crafting them into gender-neutral legislation and judicial doctrines that are
advantageous to women. Only then can equality of treatment be coextensive with equality of results for both women and men.
Appendix
State Equal Rights Amendments
Alaska
No person is to be denied the enjoyment of any civil or political right because of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin. The
legislature shall implement this section. Alaska Const. art. I, s 3 (ratified 1972).

Colorado
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the state of Colorado or any of its political subdivisions on

account of sex. Colo. Const. art. II, s 29 (ratified 1972).

Connecticut
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or
enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, or sex. Conn. Const.
art. I, s 20 (ratified 1974) (amended 1984).

Hawaii
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the State on account of sex. The legislature shall have the
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this section. Haw. Const. art. I, s 3 (ratified 1972).

Illinois
The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local government
and school districts. Ill. Const. art. I, s 18 (ratified 1970).

Louisiana
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or
religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person
because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations. La. Const. art. I, s 3 (ratified 1974).

Maryland
Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex. Md. Const. art. 46 (ratified 1972).

Massachusetts
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned
the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; in fine, that
of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness. Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex,
race, color, creed or national origin. Mass. Const. part I, art. 1 (ratified 1976).

Montana
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor
any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights
on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas. Mont. Const. art. II, s 4 (ratified
1972).

New Mexico
Equality of rights under law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person. N.M. Const. art. II, s 18 (ratified 1972).

Pennsylvania
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of
the individual. Pa. Const. art. I, s 28 (ratified 1971).

Texas
Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. Tex. Const. art. I,
s 3a (ratified 1972).

Utah
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both male
and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and privileges. Utah Const. art. IV, s
1 (ratified 1896).

Virginia
The right to be free from any governmental discrimination upon the basis of religious conviction, race, color, sex, or national
origin shall not be abridged, except that the mere separation of the sexes shall not be considered discrimination. Va. Const. art.
I, s 11 (ratified 1970).

Washington
Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Wash. Const. art. XXXI,
s 1 (ratified 1972).

Wyoming
In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the human race are equal. Wyo. Const. art. I,
s 2 (ratified 1889).
Since equality in the enjoyment of natural and civil rights is only made sure through political equality, the laws of this state
affecting the political rights and privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, color, sex, or any circumstance or
condition whatsoever other than individual incompetency, or unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Id. s 3.
The rights of citizens of the State of Wyoming to vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both
male and female citizens of this state shall equally enjoy all civil, political and religious rights and privileges. Id. art. VI, s 1.
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that required widower but not widow to prove actual dependence on deceased spouse’s earnings to qualify for death
benefits). The Court, however, disagreed about whether the law disadvantaged the widower himself or his working wife
because the wife can expect fewer death benefits to be paid to her spouse than those payable to the spouses of her male
co-workers. Compare id. at 147-49 (holding that the law discriminated against both males and females) with id. at 155
(Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the law discriminated solely against males).

18

See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1981) (upholding a gender-based statutory rape statute and
finding “nothing to suggest that men, because of past discrimination or peculiar disadvantages, are in need of the special
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Law (1987).
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See Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1699, 1701-02 (1990). Professor Radin
writes, “There are two ways to think about justice. One is to think about justice in an ideal world .... The other is to
think about nonideal justice: given where we now find ourselves, what is the better decision?” Id. at 1700.
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The proposed federal Equal Rights Amendment stated, in relevant part:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. H.R.J.
Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
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See Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk & Ann E. Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871, 889 (1971). The authors contend,

The basic principle of the Equal Rights Amendment is that sex is not a permissible factor in determining the legal rights
of women, or of men. This means that the treatment of any person by the law may not be based upon the circumstance
that such person is of one sex or the other.... Differentiation in treatment may rest upon particular characteristics or
traits of the persons affected, such as strength, intelligence, and the like. But under the Equal Rights Amendment the
existence of such a characteristic or trait to a greater degree in one sex does not justify classification by sex rather than
by the particular characteristic or trait.... In short, sex is a prohibited classification. Id. The authors reject the notion that
the ERA merely requires strict scrutiny for gender classifications because strict scrutiny allows judges impermissible
discretion in determining whether an asserted state goal is compelling and whether the law is necessary to achieve that
goal. See id. at 909.
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Id. at 893-94. This unique physical characteristics exception, for instance, would permit laws establishing medical leave
for childbearing (but not child rearing) because such a classification is based on an actual physical difference between
the sexes. Id. at 894.
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See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (upholding a state law limiting women’s employment in factories
or laundries to ten hours a day on the grounds that a woman’s “physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal
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See MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 1286-97. Accordingly, MacKinnon also laments the shift in the proposed language
of the federal ERA from an affirmative guarantee of equal rights, as is embodied in the 1923 version, to a mere negative
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Under MacKinnon’s analysis, such subordinating social practices include sex segregation in poverty, violence against
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note 32, at 769.
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